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Abstract 
This paper shows that increasing the sanction on collective crime may increase its prevalence. This situation arises 
when individuals can commit crimes both individually and as part of a collective. Our result is based on an 
interdependence between detection probabilities where detection of an individual crime may result in the uncovering of 
the collective crime as well.
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     1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Main Result
Criminal opportunities are manifold. Some are easily accomplished alone, whereas others
require the cooperation of individuals. An example of the former could be an act of de-
ception or street robbery, while protection racketeering or extortion more appropriately fall
into the latter category. Given the variety of opportunities for crime, it will often hold
that individuals engaged in collective crime do not forfeit the possibility to perform ad-
ditional individual crimes. However, committing crimes usually leaves traces in one way
or another. Consequently, detecting the perpetrator of one oﬀense may lead to her other
oﬀenses also being uncovered. For instance, in conducting a search for evidence of a drug
oﬀense, stolen goods from a robbery with another individual could also be discovered. It is
such interdependencies that this paper investigates.
We establish the counterintuitive result that increasing sanctions on a crime can increase
its prevalence. Our ﬁnding can be explained as follows: members of criminal organizations
can undertake individual oﬀenses in addition to the collective crime without conferring with
the other members of the criminal organization. This may happen although the individual
oﬀense bears implications for the expected payoﬀ of the collective crime. The latter interde-
pendence follows from our assumption that the detection of individual crimes might uncover
suﬃcient evidence to penalize the collective crime as well. In that sense, the undertaking
of the individual crime exerts an externality as it changes the payoﬀs of other members of
the criminal organization without this fact being reﬂected in the calculus of the individual.
As a consequence, it may be that individuals transgress individually although this does
not maximize the sum of payoﬀs. However, members of criminal organizations may ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to credibly commit to abstaining from individual crime. The fact that for certain
conﬁgurations of enforcement parameters, members of criminal organizations ﬁnd it pri-
vately optimal to undertake an individual crime in addition to the collective transgression
and thereby increase the expected sanction for the collective crime, might eﬀect whether or
not the latter crime is undertaken in the ﬁrst place. We then establish that an increase in
the sanction for collective crime might allow members of criminal organizations to credibly
commit to abstaining from individual crime, which in turn makes collective crime proﬁtable
again. In other words, an increase in the sanction for collective crime can increase the
prevalence of collective crime.
The fact that a change in the sanction for collective crime can impact an individual’s
ability to commit to abstaining from the individual oﬀense holds for the following reason:
given that the collective crime is agreed on, the undertaking of the individual oﬀense could
not only lead to an expected sanction for this crime but could also increase the expected
sanction for the collective crime. This latter part of the change in the total expected sanc-
tion is aﬀected by a variation in the sanction for collective crime. Given that the sanction
for the collective crime is of a suﬃcient magnitude, the total burden from undertaking indi-
vidual crime is no longer surpassed by the beneﬁt therefrom, allowing individuals’ credible
commitment.
1.2 Relation to the Literature
We study the coexistence of individual and collective crime, whereas most contributions to
the literature focus on individual crimes.
1The bulk of the literature addressing optimal law enforcement with individual potential
oﬀenders ﬁnds that an increase in the sanction results in higher deterrence (see, e.g., Polinsky
and Shavell 2007). In contrast, this study ﬁnds that increasing the sanction of a crime
may increase its prevalence. Tsebelis (1989) establishes in a 2x2 game in which (i) the
individual either oﬀends or does not and the policeman either monitors or does not, and (ii)
only a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, that an increase in the sanction only aﬀects the
monitoring probability of the policeman. However, this result is due to the particularities
of mixed strategies. Andreoni (1991) also ﬁnds that increasing the sanction for a crime may
actually encourage it. However, the fact which drives his result is that juries perceiving
error costs may be less willing to convict a suspect if the sanction is higher.
We allow for two diﬀerent types of oﬀenses. Diﬀerent oﬀense categories may have dif-
ferent implications for society. It then becomes interesting how deterrence is optimally
structured in view of these diﬀerent criminal activities. This topic has been touched upon
in the literature addressing optimal law enforcement given individual potential oﬀenders by
Shavell (1992) and Mookherjee and Png (1994). For instance, Shavell shows that it may be
beneﬁcial to set the sanction for oﬀenses with lower harm at less than the maximal level in
order to steer undeterred individuals who choose between acts towards less harmful ones.
This is in contrast to our setting, in which we ﬁnd that increasing the sanction for a given
act may be in order if it is preferred that individuals undertake this act rather than another
one.
There is also literature that deals with organized or collective crime. Analysts often
conceptualize organized crime as a monopolistic ﬁrm and build their analysis on that. For
instance, Schelling (1967), Buchanan (1973), Gambetta and Reuter (1995), and Garoupa
(2000) feature this approach. Given that criminal activity is usually considered detrimental,
any contraction in the number of oﬀenses due to imperfect competition may be welcome.
We do not delve into the subject of market structure but simply allow for strictly positive
gross beneﬁts from individual and collective crime. Garoupa (2007) instead focuses on the
internal structure of a criminal organization. The study by Chang et al. (2005) is closest
to our pursuit but still very diﬀerent in its objective. They allow for the coexistence of
individual and collective crime but require potential oﬀenders to choose between the two in
order to arrive at conclusions about the endogenous organizational structure. For instance,
Chang et al. (2005) contrast a uniform and an ability-adhering payoﬀ sharing scheme to
determine whether high-ability or low-ability oﬀenders are organized. In contrast, we posit
that both kinds of criminal opportunities might be undertaken at the same time and analyze
the potential repercussions this fact bears on the eﬀects ﬂowing from law enforcement.
In view of the above discussion, we assert that our analysis contributes to the literature
in two ways: we are the ﬁrst to allow for individual and collective crime to be undertaken
at the same time, and, in so doing, introduce possibly important interdependencies. Next,
we illustrate a context in which an increase in the sanction for collective crime may increase
the prevalence of collective crime.1 Our analysis focuses on the comparative statics with
respect to the sanction for collective crime, highlighting our counterintuitive central ﬁnding
but refraining from a full-ﬂedged discussion of optimal law enforcement. The structure of
the paper in which we bring these aspects to the fore is as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 presents decision-making by potential oﬀenders. Section 4 concludes.
1Kugler et al. (2005) also ﬁnd that harsher punishment can encourage collective crime. However, their
line of reasoning requires corruption of law enforcers, which is absent in our setup.
22 The Model
We investigate a three-stage game involving three players, two (symmetric) individuals and
nature. At Stage 1, the two individuals agree on whether to commit a collective crime.
At Stage 2, individuals non-cooperatively decide whether to commit the individual oﬀense.
Finally, at Stage 3, a draw by nature determines whether crimes are detected by law en-
forcement authorities. We consider this sequence to be the most natural as individuals who
have agreed to participate in collective crime may also oﬀend individually on the side.
The beneﬁt derived from collective [individual] crime is C [I] for each individual. If
potential oﬀenders opt only for collective [individual] crime, each faces an expected sanction
of pFC [qFI], where p[q] ∈ (0,1) is the detection probability and FC [FI] the applicable
sanction.2 We are interested in the eﬀects when the crimes are interrelated in that the
detection of one crime may result in uncovering the other transgression. We focus on the
case in which the detection of the individual crime reveals information about the collective
crime, i.e. a unidirectional interdependency.
3 The Analysis
Given the extensive structure of the game with perfect information, we apply backward
induction, starting at Stage 2, the stage where the individual decides on the undertaking of
the individual crime.
If potential oﬀenders have agreed at Stage 1 not to opt for the collective crime, individuals
choose the individual oﬀense at Stage 2 if I ≥ qFI, i.e. if the individual crime yields a positive
net beneﬁt.
If potential oﬀenders have agreed at Stage 1 to opt for the collective crime, an individual’s
decision with respect to the individual crime at Stage 2 not only aﬀects his own payoﬀ but
also exerts a negative externality on his accomplice. Table 1 represents the corresponding
subgame. Σ1 [Σ2] denotes the compound detection probability for the collective crime if one
[both] individual[s] undertake[s] the individual crime. These probabilities are given by
Σ1 =p + (1 − p)q (1)
Σ2 =p + (1 − p){q + (1 − q)q} (2)
=p + (1 − p)q(2 − q) (3)
These deﬁnitions reﬂect our assumption that the detection of an individual crime implies
the uncovering of the collective crime. It holds that Σ2 > Σ1 > p. Σ1 may be explained
as follows. The direct detection of collective crime occurs with probability p. However,
the collective crime may be detected even if it is not directly detected, which occurs with
probability (1−p), but is uncovered in connection with the detection of the single individual
oﬀense undertaken, which occurs with probability q. Σ2 applies if both individuals undertake
an individual crime in addition to the collective crime. The indirect uncovering of the
collective crime is possible by detecting either of the two individual acts. This explains the
term q + (1 − q)q in (2). As a consequence, the probability of uncovering the collective
crime is concave with respect to the number of group members that commit the individual
crime. This is due to the fact that the undertaking of the second individual crime increases
2The probabilities p and q might both depend on enforcement eﬀort and be interdependent in some way.
We refrain from a complete speciﬁcation of p and q since the focus of our comparative statics analysis lies
with the sanction for the collective crime FC.
3the probability of the collective crime being uncovered only in the event that the ﬁrst
accomplice’s individual crime has not been detected.3
Action Oﬀend individually (OI) Do not oﬀend individually (NI)
OI I + C − Σ2FC − qFI, I + C − Σ2FC − qFI I + C − Σ1FC − qFI, C − Σ1FC
NI C − Σ1FC, I + C − Σ1FC − qFI C − pFC, C − pFC
Table 1: Stage 2 subgame given collective crime
Looking at Table 1, we inquire into the potential equilibria of this subgame at Stage 2.
In order to establish an equilibrium in which both individuals do (not) oﬀend, we make use
of critical values for the sanction FC.
Lemma 1 Given that individuals agree on committing the collective crime,
(i) the individual oﬀense by both is an equilibrium if FC ≤
I−qFI
q(1−p)(1−q) = ¯ FC,
(ii) no individual oﬀense by both is an equilibrium if FC ≥
I−qFI
(1−p)q = ˆ FC.
Proof. To obtain the equilibrium (NI, NI), it is required that the beneﬁt from the
individual crime, I, falls short of the increase in the individually expected sanction, qFI +
(Σ1 − p)FC, which is equivalent to FC ≥
I−qFI
q(1−p). For (OI, OI) to be an equilibrium, the
reduction in the individually expected sanction from not committing the individual act,
qFI + [(Σ2 − p) − (Σ1 − p)]FC, must not exceed foregone beneﬁts, I, i.e. FC ≤
I−qFI
q(1−p)(1−q).
With respect to an ordering of critical values of the sanction for collective crime, we
note that q(1−p) > q(1−p)(1−q) holds. The term q(1−p) represents the increase in the
compound probability that the collective crime is detected if one instead of no individual
oﬀends individually. The term q(1 − p)(1 − q) represents the increase in the compound
probability that the collective crime is detected if two instead of one individual oﬀend
individually. The inequality implies that ˆ FC < ¯ FC.
We may summarize that, given a collective crime, there is an equilibrium in (NI,NI) if
FC > ¯ FC, there is one equilibrium in (NI,NI) and one equilibrium in (OI,OI) if ˆ FC < FC <
¯ FC, and there is an equilibrium in (OI,OI) if FC < ˆ FC. Both equilibria exist if the sanction
for collective crime is set at some intermediate level, i.e. if FC ∈ [ ˆ FC, ¯ FC]. Since we are
analyzing decisions of individuals with a cooperative interaction at Stage 1, we assume that
both agree on the equilibrium with higher payoﬀs in case both equilibria exist. Furthermore,
we deduce that (OI, NI) can never be an equilibrium. For FC < ¯ FC, NI is not a best answer
to OI. For FC > ˆ FC, OI is not a best answer to NI.
Lemma 2 (i) Given that individuals agree on undertaking the collective crime and FC ∈
[ ˆ FC, ¯ FC], both individuals credibly commit to not oﬀending individually.
(ii) Given that individuals agree on undertaking the collective crime, undertaking individual
oﬀenses as well maximizes the sum of payoﬀs only if FC <
I−qFI
q(1−p)(2−q) = ˜ FC.
Proof. For payoﬀs from (OI, OI) to be higher than payoﬀs from (NI, NI), beneﬁts of the
individual crime I have to surpass the increase in the expected sanction qFI + (Σ2 − p)FC,
which is equivalent to FC < ˜ FC. Since ˜ FC < ˆ FC, when choosing between two equilibria,
individuals always agree on not undertaking the individual crime if FC ∈ [ ˆ FC, ¯ FC].
We summarize our ﬁndings in
3For small values of q, Σ2 could be approximated by p+(1−p)2q, resulting in a linear relationship. This
would not aﬀect the main results derived in the paper.
4Proposition 1 Given that individuals agree on committing the collective crime, both indi-
viduals choose the individual crime if FC ≤ ˆ FC, but there is no individual crime otherwise.
Proof. Follows from the above.
The proposition in combination with Lemma 2 highlight that individual crime by both
individuals occurs if ˜ FC < FC < ˆ FC although this is to the detriment of the sum of payoﬀs.
Given that both individuals agree on committing the collective crime, there is an upside,
represented by I, to also oﬀending as an individual. The downside of oﬀending as an
individual depends on whether only one actor or both actors do so. The reason is that the
individual oﬀense increases the detection probability of the collective crime.
Suppose that one individual does not oﬀend individually. If the other individual decides
to oﬀend individually, the downside from this decision for this individual is given by (Σ1 −
p)FC + qFI. That is why the individual in this case would prefer to oﬀend individually as
long as FC < ˆ FC. Consequently, committing to the equilibrium (NI, NI) is credible only
if FC > ˆ FC. Although the sum of individual payoﬀs would be higher by not committing
any individual oﬀenses as long as ˆ FC > FC > ˜ FC, coordination on not committing the
individual crime is no longer credible for FC < ˆ FC, due to the negative externality inherent
in individual crimes.
Next, we move to Stage 1 where individuals decide on collective crime. Without collective
crime, individuals gain max{0,I − qFI}. With collective crime, individual payoﬀs are I +
C − Σ2FC − qFI for FC < ˆ FC or C − pFC otherwise.
We are interested in the eﬀect of changes in FC on oﬀenses committed. To make the
analysis interesting, suppose that I > qFI, so that the individual crime is in itself attractive.4
The payoﬀ I−qFI will thus be the alternative to any payoﬀs associated with collective crime.
It follows that collective crime will be deterred by setting FC very high. In contrast, for small
FC, it is clearly optimal for criminals to commit the collective as well as the individual crime
as long as C > Σ2FC. This option, however, quickly loses attractiveness with increasing FC
due to Σ2 being relatively large. It becomes of interest what outcome results next.
As established above, the case in which both individuals only commit the collective
oﬀense yields higher payoﬀs than the case in which they undertake both oﬀenses if FC ≥ ˜ FC.
However, (NI, NI) is an equilibrium only if FC ≥ ˆ FC. Individuals might also agree not to
perform the collective act. When comparing payoﬀs of the case in which both crimes are
committed (C + I − Σ2FC − qFI) to the one in which only individual crimes take place
(I−qFI), beneﬁts from the former only exceed those from the latter for FC < C
Σ2 = F ∗
C. Note
that ˆ FC and F ∗
C cannot be ranked unambiguously. Consequently, the outcome “collective
and individual crime”, which results for small FC, changes when increasing the sanction for
collective crime, to the outcome “individual crime only” at F ∗
C if F ∗
C < ˆ FC. Alternatively,
the increase may change the outcome to one in which only collective crime takes place.
This would occur at ˆ FC if ˆ FC < F ∗
C were to hold. In this latter case, increasing the





C so that collective crime is eradicated.
Having introduced all critical values for the sanction of collective crime which are of
importance for our analysis, we summarize these for quick reference in Table 2.
Suppose now that F ∗
C < ˆ FC. In this case, the outcome “individual crime only” is
obtained for FC ∈ [F ∗
C, ˆ FC). At FC = ˆ FC, individuals compare I − qFI and C − pFC as
the commitment to no individual oﬀenses becomes credible. Consequently, individuals may
4If the net beneﬁt from individual crime were not positive, our analysis would reduce to one considering
only whether collective crime is proﬁtable or not, i.e. a comparison of C and pFC.
5Critical level Explanation
˜ FC Payoﬀs from (OI,OI) are equal to
payoﬀs from (NI,NI), given collective crime
F∗
C Payoﬀs from collective crime and (OI,OI) are equal to
payoﬀs from individual crime alone
ˆ FC Individual payoﬀs from (NI,NI) are equal to
payoﬀs from (OI,NI) for the ﬁrst individual, given collective crime
¯ FC Individual payoﬀs from (OI,OI) are equal to
payoﬀs from (OI,NI) for the second individual, given collective crime
F+
C Payoﬀs from collective crime alone are equal to
payoﬀs from individual crime alone
Table 2: Critical values for the sanction of collective crime
switch to undertaking only the collective crime. This implies that an increase in the sanction
for collective crime may re-introduce the undertaking of collective crime.
For this sequence of outcomes, we need both F ∗
C < ˆ FC and C −p ˆ FC > I −qFI, i.e. ˆ FC <
F
+
C , to hold. These conditions can be simultaneously fulﬁlled and intuitively interpreted
by comparing the beneﬁts from collective crime C, on the one hand, and the individual
net beneﬁt from the individual act, I − qFI, on the other. The ﬁrst condition, F ∗
C < ˆ FC,
requires the beneﬁt from the collective act not to be too large in comparison to I − qFI.
For FC > F ∗
C, the individual act implies a higher payoﬀ than the undertaking of both
kinds of acts, while FC < ˆ FC implies that undertaking only the collective crime is not
credible. As a consequence, F ∗
C < FC < ˆ FC implies that collective crime is eradicated,
necessitating that C is not too large. The second condition, ˆ FC < F
+
C , demands a C of
suﬃcient size in comparison to I − qFI. This results from the fact that, given commitment
is possible due to a higher sanction on the collective crime, payoﬀs from the collective crime
alone must outweigh foregone beneﬁts from individual crimes in order to re-introduce the
undertaking of collective crime. Note that ˜ FC < F ∗
C < ˆ FC is a necessary prerequisite for
both conditions to be fulﬁlled, which again highlights the negative externality entailed in
individual crimes as the distinctive feature generating our result. As a consequence of the
externality there is a divergence between individual and collective incentives with regard to
the individual transgression, represented by the existence of the interval [ ˜ FC, ˆ FC]. If FC is




p holds eventually, which implies - as alluded to before
- that only individual crimes take place for very large FC.
We distinctly summarize our central ﬁnding in
Proposition 2 If F ∗
C < ˆ FC < F
+
C , we obtain the following outcomes:
(i) Collective and individual crime if FC < F ∗
C,
(ii) Individual crime if F ∗
C ≤ FC < ˆ FC,
(iii) Collective crime if ˆ FC ≤ FC < F
+
C ,
(iv) Individual crime if FC ≥ F
+
C .
Proof. Follows from above.
Proposition 2 summarizes our central result: an increase in the sanction for collective
crime may increase its prevalence. The rationale can be provided by reference to whether
members of criminal organizations can credibly commit not to undertake individual trans-
gressions. This is not the case if F ∗
C ≤ FC < ˆ FC. In that case, the fact that individuals
6anticipate at the ﬁrst stage that individual transgressions, which increase the expected sanc-
tioning of collective crime, will occur, makes actors opt against collective crime. In contrast,
if ˆ FC ≤ FC < F
+
C , the individual oﬀense given collective crime is no longer tempting at Stage
2, which makes the attainment of an outcome with only collective crime possible. This fact
makes collective crime more proﬁtable, where this type of crime is more proﬁtable than indi-
vidual crime alone if FC < F
+
C . As a consequence, collective crime occurs after elevating the
sanction for collective crime from the interval F ∗




This paper establishes that an increase in the sanction for a certain act may increase its
prevalence in equilibrium. This result stands in contrast to the standard ﬁndings in law
enforcement literature. We derive the result in a setting which allows potential oﬀenders to
undertake individual and collective crime. Thus, our analysis considers interdependencies
between crimes and their enforcement. Our result can be used to counter seemingly straight-
forward policy recommendations, such as that an increase in the sanction for some behavior
acts like an increase in the price for undertaking this behavior and therefore induces less
behavior of this type. In our setting, the policy maker might rather reduce the sanction on
collective crime if his priority is on preventing this type of crime.
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